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DISRUPTING INDIVIDUALISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE
REMEDIES WITH INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND
EMPOWERMENT: AN APPROACH TO
JUSTICE AND DISCOURSE
john a. powell*
INTRODUCTION
I will start with a quotation from Andre Gorz that will
help set the tone:
We have no words to speak about our
oppression, our distress, our bitterness, and our
revolt against the exhaustion, the stupidity, the
monotony, the lack of meaning of our work and
of our life, against the contempt in which our
work is held; against the despotic hierarchy of
the factory; against a society in which we remain
the underdogs and in which goods and
enjoyments that are considered normal by other
classes are denied to us and are parceled out to
us only reluctantly, as though we were asking for
a privilege. We have no words to say what it is
and how it feels to be workers, to be held in
suspicion, to be ordered around by people who
have more and who pretend to know more and
who compel us to work according to the rules
they set and for purposes that are theirs, not ours.
And we have no words to say all this because the
ruling class has monopolized not only the power
* Professor powell is the Marvin J. Sonosky Chair in Law and Public Policy and the
Executive Director of the Institute on Race and Poverty at the University of Minnesota Law
School. The Institute was established by Professor powell to address the problems of poor
people of color. "The Institute's goals are to create scholarship, commentary, and dialogue to
promote a better understanding of the issues confronting communities which face the
combined challenges of racial segregation and poverty." The University of Minnesota Law
School's Institute on Race and Poverty Web Page (visited January 2, 2001)
<http://www.law.umn.edu/centers/race-pov.htm>. This article is based on the keynote
presentation given by Professor powell on March 4, 2000 at MARGINS' inaugural
symposium entitled Individual Rights v. Community Voice.
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of decision-making and of material wealth; they
have also monopolized culture and language.'
In the article that follows I argue that neither individualism nor
communitarianism create a language or a space for full and fair
participation in and constitution of democratic structures, and that
empowerment is the language necessary for achieving these goals. In
order to explore these notions, I will consider the following questions
in the context of individuals, communities, cities, and regions:
I. What are the consequences of the dominant ideology of
individualism for members of subordinated groups?
II. How does the ideology structure the relationship
between dominant and oppressed groups?
III. Can a solution be found among communitarian
ideology?
IV. How can we transform the nature of this relationship
and this language?
I. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY OF
INDIVIDUALISM FOR MEMBERS OF SUBORDINATED GROUPS?
A. Assimilation, Racing and the Dominant Language
"Individual" or the ideology of individualism 2 is one of the
most dominant images that oozes out of liberalism.3 "Individualism" is
a set of principles built upon the idea that people are "separate and
self-contained atoms, each with the same formal rights, [including the]
1. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 192 (1990)
(quoting Andre Gorz) (citation omitted from original).
2. "Ideology" is defined as "a set of ideals that 'helps reproduce relations of
domination or oppression by justifying them or by obscuring possible more emancipatory
social relations."' john a. powell, The Multiple Self: Exploring Between and Beyond
Modernity and Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1481, 1482 (1997) (quoting IRIS MARION
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 112 (1990).
3. "Liberalism" in this context is different from the common American political
parlance. "Liberalism" here "describes a tradition of thought that emphasizes toleration and
respect for individual rights.... ." MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA
IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 4 (1996).
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rights to keep others out, [to] separate" from the other.4
One of the ways I approach the issues of exclusion and racial
subordination is by looking at language. I conceive of "law" as a
public language, and this language of law monopolizes. In some ways,
it may be the most important monopoly for society. The hegemony of
law as language, replicative of and interacting with the hegemonic
notion of the individual, will rear its ugly head throughout this
discussion.
Individuality is a model and a process of assimilation and
racing. A book by Theodore Allen called The Invention of the White
Race discusses this process of "racing. " 5 According to Allen, "racing"
is a process by which a people are subjected to a kind of "social
death." Here, the dominant group takes away the subordinate group's
history, religion, culture, language, and voice.6 The dominant denudes
the subordinate group as human beings, and then gives them the
language and symbols of their dominant culture, with which they are
to reconstruct themselves.
7
B. The Language of Individuality: Just Who Are Individuals?
Part of the language of the dominant culture-for us in this
society and in this time-is the language of individuality. While I am
not suggesting that those of us who are members of subordinate groups
are not individuals, it is certainly not true that we are all just
individuals.8  And yet, I believe that the dominant language and
ideology of individuality blinds us to the ways in which we are not just
individuals.
The ideology of individuality had its origins in the
Enlightenment, which came concurrently with the emergence of
Colonialism.9  During this germinative period, the essence of
individualism was that Europeans were individuals as opposed to other
4. See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 227.
5. See generally THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE, VOLUME
ONE: RACIAL OPPRESSION AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1994).
6. See id. at35.
7. Id.
8. See generally john a. powell, The Multiple Self. Exploring Between and Beyond
Modernity and Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1481 (1997) [hereinafter The Multiple Sel].
9. Id. at 1486.
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people who were a "collective."' 0 The collectivity of the other served
as a rationale and justification for the exploitation of the collective
other.' 1 In other words, part of the longing to be a member of the
dominant group was tied up with being an individual. In that sense,
individuality was already racialized. Individuality and membership in
the dominant culture meant something in particular in a specific
moment related to white Europeans, although it was not clear at that
moment that they were white. In fact, they were still in the process
of becoming white.13 The ideology of individualism as o V osed to the
ideology of collectivity was part of the whiteness process.
Given the racialized origination of individualism, the decision
to position oneself outside of the language and process of the ideology
has tempted members of subaltern groups. Rejecting this temptation,
feminist scholar Robin West has suggested that if what is meant by
"human being" is a self-contained, free standing, autonomous
individual, then women are not individuals. 15  Because women
experience a sense of relationship that is counterfactual for that
definition of human being, women are not human beings. 16
Embracing the language of individualism is fraught with
dangers. As we think about what it means to be an individual and how
the law pulls us into that discourse, the negative effects of insinuating
ourselves into the ideology of individuality often blind us. Still, the
negative effects of trying to be like everyone else are not totally
obscured. For example, consider the debate surrounding affirmative
10. Id.
11. See generally id. at 1490; and ALLEN, supra note 5, at 32-35 (noting that at that
moment in history the category of the "other" included the Irish, indigenous people in the New
World, and people of Africa and African descent).
12. See ALLEN, supra note 5, at 27-28 (noting that historically, groups like the Irish,
though "white" were still treated as the "other").
13. See, e.g., id.(noting that various authors have noted that "whiteness" is a transparent
concept, meaning different things at different times, depending on the current politically
dominant culture's need to oppress the subordinate one).
14. See The Multiple Self supra note 8, at 1490 (noting "[b]y construing the essence of
the human self as individual and autonomous, European thinkers deliberately excluded from
selfhood members of non-White societies that were organized around non-individualistic
norms").
15. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1988).
16. Id. (noting that women are invariably "'connected' to life and to other human beings
during at least four recurrent and critical material experiences: the experience of pregnancy
itself; the invasive and 'connecting' experience of heterosexual penetration, which may lead to
pregnancy; and the monthly experience of menstruation, which represents the potential for
pregnancy; and the post-pregnancy experience of breast feeding").
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action. At one time, the discussion of remedying discrimination in
employment and education focused on women and people of color
deserving to be treated just like everybody else. This begged the
question: who is this "everybody else"? It is not unusual for blacks,
Latinos, Asian Americans, women, and persons with disabilities to
argue that they want to be treated like individuals. In other words,
they want to be treated just like everybody else.
This exhortation is understandable given the history of these
individuals being fused into a group and being stereotyped as the
other. But responding by wanting to be just like everyone else does
not really address the problem. In fact, this response can serve to
reproduce problems. In my opinion, this unreflective desire to be like
everyone else is an attempt to reclaim a destroyed social life by
reconstructinj it in the dominant group's language-the language of
individuality. '
II. How DOES THE IDEOLOGY STRUCTURE THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN DOMINANT AND OPPRESSED GROUPS?
A. Distributive Justice vs. Institutional Arrangements
The problem is not primarily one of categorization or even
necessarily discrimination. Iris Young argues effectively that what we
face is a problem of domination and oppression.' 8 While it may be
true that the lion's share of discourse on discrimination focuses on
individual harms and victims, domination, oppression, and exploitation
do not occur solely at the individual or interpersonal level, but also at
the collective or systemic level. 19 It is apparent that oppression and
17. See generally ALLEN, supra note 5 and discussion, supra pp. 2-3 (discussing the
process of "racing" and subjection of the subordinate group to a "social death").
18. See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing-
[T]hat instead of focusing on distribution, a conception of justice
should begin with the concepts of domination and oppression. Such a
shift brings out the issues of decisionmaking, division of labor, and culture
that bear on social justice but are often ignored .... It also exhibits the
importance of social group differences in structuring social relations and
oppression .... I argue that where social group differences exist and
some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, social justice
requires explicitly acknowledging and attending to those group differences
in order to undermine oppression.).
19. See john a. powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to Interrogate Racial
Privilege, 34 U.S.F. L. REv. 419, 449 (2000) (quoting, among other cases that evince a refusal
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domination occur at the systemic or collective level when noting that
they are often sanctioned by the language, structure, institutions, and
practices in a society. 20 Indeed, John Rawls suggested that if we want
to know whether a society was just, we should not tarry too long on
the individual attitudes people hold in that society. Instead, Rawls
calls our attention to the institutional arrangements and structures in
those societies.
21
Remedies for domination and oppression have clearly not kept
pace with theory about the topics themselves. One example of the
troubling, lagging thinking in this regard surrounds the distributive
formula for justice.22 The rationale behind this form of justice is that
society is unjust because power and resources are not fairly distributed
among individuals. Under this theory, redistribution amongst
individuals will cure the defects of the unjust society. 23 Again, there is
an essential unit to this calculation, and that unit is the individual. Iris
Young, along with others, suggests that the primary role for justice is
not simply that of distribution, but is a much larger role.24 Under this
on the part of the Court to hear cases of systemic rather than individual discrimination, Justice
Powell's opinion for the Court in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, where Justice
Powell writes that "[s]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy .... No one doubts that there has been serious racial
discrimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that
work against innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and over-expansive.").
476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (holding it was impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause to
retain minority teachers over nonminority teachers with more seniority in an attempt to
provide more role models for minority schoolchildren).
20. See generally JOHN P. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 6-10 (1971).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 284 (1981) (arguing that "an equal division of resources presupposes
an economic market of some form, mainly as an analytic device but also, to a certain extent, as
an actual political institution"). But see Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 599, 636 (arguing that "a focus on the distribution of primary goods and
resources will fail to give us an accurate sense of the justness of different social arrangements
because that focus ignores issues of conversion. Different individuals have different
capabilities to convert goods... and resources into freedoms.").
23. One example of which is the distribution of jobs under an affirmative action
program. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1781
(1993) (citing RONALD J. Fiscus, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 8-9
(Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1992) (stating that "the case for affirmative action often is premised
on the need to compensate minorities for harms done to them in the past-a discussion that
admits of interpretations consistent with both compensatory and distributive justice claims").
24. See generally YOUNG, supra note I, at 15-38 (arguing that the distributive paradigm
is problematic in that:
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paradigm, justice requires calling institutions into being, naming those
institutions, and, indeed, constructing the language itself, giving those
institutions meaning.
2 5
There is a theory in terms of individuality that I would like to
describe for a few moments. The theory starts from the premise that
"society" is an artificial concept. Under this paradigm, society is
simply an aggregate of individuals. The theory can also be captured in
the common expression, "the whole is equal to the sum of its parts."
The converse of this notion is the theoretical disaggregate. It says that
if you take things apart, you are able to analyze and fully understand
the whole. This perspective is one of reductionism.
A counter theory suggests that the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts. Moreover, this theory suggests that when you bring
people together something happens that cannot be reduced to the
individual constituent parts. In other words, there may be something
different about the whole beyond just the individuals. This theory
suggests that the group can be more than the aggregate of individuals.
The veracity or falsity of individuality, or whether individuality
springs from some sort of process, some sort of constituted collective
process, is one of the huge debates worth having today. Such a debate
could be constituted as the platform for the kind of transformation of
justice that Iris Young envisions.26
First, it tends to focus thinking about social justice on the allocation of
material goods.. . , ignor[ing] the social structure and institutional context
that often help determine distributive patterns. ... [And slecond when
extended to nonmaterial goods and resources, the logic of distribution
misrepresents them.).
25. See, e.g.,YoUNG, supra note 1, at 40-41 (discussing the notion that one needs to
name an institution in order to avoid ignoring its total effect on society. For example,
"oppression" is a concept which traditionally meant "the exercise of tyranny by a ruling
group." However, as Young points out, "[in its new usage, oppression designates the
disadvantage and injustice some people suffer not because a tyrannical power coerces them,
but because of everyday practices of a well-intentioned liberal society .... [It also means in
the structural sense] "structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market
mechanisms...." Says Young, "we cannot eliminate this structural oppression by getting rid
of the rulers or making some new laws, because oppressions are systematically reproduced in
major economic, political, and cultural institutions.").
26. See generally YOUNG, supra note 1.
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B. Individuality: Too High a Price to Pay?
I will turn now again to the implications of these conflicting
notions of individualism, society, and justice for racial minorities,
other subordinated groups, and dominant groups. How does
individualism operate on race and gender today? The answer from the
individualist camp is that race and gender do not exist.27 We are all
just individuals. Any characteristic that does not reflect that
individuality is simply an accident. 28 In other words, any marker of
gender, race, or sexuality around which meaning is constructed
socially is largely irrelevant.
In a way individuality, even as it purports to take into account
our distinctness, makes us all the same in fundamental ways. We are
all rational, autonomous people and therefore we should all be treated
the same. The focus on discrimination is consistent with the idea of
individuality and the idea that we are all the same in some important
ways. Thus, individuality becomes a model for assimilation. We are
all exactly alike. One therefore cannot claim to have not received
equal treatment unless one can claim this sameness. But what are the
consequences of embracing this stance for subordinated and
marginalized groups?
One of my noble white friends talks about the fact that, when
he was a kid, he was nervous around black people. His parents would
tell him there was no need to be nervous around black people because
"they are just like you." After that, whenever he would see a black
person, he would point to them and he would say, "just like Jimmy,
just like Jimmy." In this way, Jimmy had become the norm. In other
words, "Jimmy" had become the thing against which everybody else
was measured. In order to be "just like Jimmy" you would have to
sometimes shed important differences. Those differences would have
to be ignored or denied. And what happens to those who are not just
like Jimmy?
27. See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 1, at 157 (noting that-
We seek a society in which differences of race, sex, religion, and ethnicity
no longer make a difference to people's rights and opportunities. People
should be treated as individuals, not as members of groups; their life
options and rewards should be based solely on their individual
achievement.).
28. Id.
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In his important book of essays, The Price of the Ticket, James
Baldwin talked about the price of inclusion or the cost of belonging in
American society. 29 Baldwin asked, "what do you have to give up in
order to gain membership in society?" For Baldwin, the price of the
ticket was too high if it meant giving up everything that made him who
he was.30  Furthermore, I argue that to accept the language of
individuality, to accept a reductionist or assimilationist perspective,
and to deny important differences, is also too high a price to pay.
III. CAN A SOLUTION BE FOUND AMONG COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY?
A. Communitarianism and the Right to Privacy
What, then, is an alternative to this ideology of individualism?
One solution that has grown in strength of support is the solution of
community. One premise for a communitarian ideology is that though
we are individuals, we are not free standing, separate, autonomous,
possessive individuals, we do desire a relationship--a community.3
1
A subscriber to communitarian theory "believes in the process of
collective, deliberative dialogue amongst the community of all citizens
towards a conception of the common good. 32 However, I argue that
the ideology of community is as limited and prone to assimilation and
the dissolution of important differences as is the ideology of
individuality. Why?
Communitarianism, particularly as conceived of by Michael
Sandel, Alasdair Maclntyre, and others, is really just the flip side of
individualism.33 The notion that undergirds it is one of homogeneity
29. JAMES BALDWIN, THE PRICE OF THE TICKET: COLLECTED NONFICTION 1948-1985
(1985).
30. See generally id. at xx.
31. See Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/P ostmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 291, 324 (1985) (discussing Macintyre's project of rejecting autonomy while
desiring community and noting that Maclntyre often comes "close to denying the value of
autonomy altogether." A denial, says Comell, that "should not be allowed to obscure the
difficulties of achieving a modem reconciliation between the individual and the community
without diminishing the values of autonomy and equality.").
32. See Sheila Foster, Community and Identity in a Postmodern World, 7 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 181, 184-185 (1992) (book review) (reviewing Martha Minow's MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1992)).
33. Compare MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AmERICA IN SEARCH OF
A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 3 (1996) (arguing that there are two fears that "lie at the heart of
democracy's discontent. One is the fear that, individually and collectively, we are losing
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or sameness. Like individualism, communitarianism holds that people
in a given community are all the same in some sort of collective sense,
rather than in an individual-based sense, and therefore anyone who is
different than the community does not belong to that community.34 I
argue that a community can only be forged if members are completely
transparent to each other, can completely know each other, and
therefore are able to fuse together into a collective. And yet, because
the self evades these types of knowledge and solidity,
communitarianism fails for the same reasons that individualism fails.
On one hand, we have the assimilated individual. On the other
hand, we have the assimilated community. In individualism, when
women, gays, or people of color stand in relationship to either the
notion of the individual or the community, they stand outside the
boundaries.35 They are beyond the margins because they do not reflect
the values that are being advanced by that concept of individuality-
the values of the rational, free-standing, separate and autonomous
person or community, of the human being that Robin West would
reject. 36 And in community, when women, gays, or people of color do
not reflect the kind of homogeneous values that have become
synonymous with that community, they stand outside the margins
too.
37
The lack of homogeneity and marginalization is perceptible not
only in philosophical spheres or in legal terms, but in very concrete
terms. For example, in the law, both individualism and
communitarianism reflect a sense of privacy, that is a sense of the
possibility and the valor of autonomy. Individualism asserts the
privacy of the person, and communitarianism asserts the privacy of the
control of the forces that govern our lives. The other is the sense that, from family to
neighborhood to nation, the moral fabric of community is unraveling around us. These two
fears-for the loss of self-government and the erosion of community-together define the
anxiety of the age."), with ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTuE: A STUDY IN MoRAL
THEORY 30-34 (American ed., 1981) (concluding that "[tihus the society in which we live is
one in which bureaucracy and individualism are partners as well as antagonists."), and Glen
0. Robinson, Communities, 83 VA. L. REv. 269, 294 (1997) (calling community the converse
of individual autonomy).
34. Note that some view communitarianism as a strain of individualism. See, e.g.,
Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REv. 685,
701-707 (1991).
35. See discussion of individualism, supra pp. 2-5.
36. See West, supra note 15, at 2-3; see also discussion supra p. 4 & n. 17.
37. See Foster, supra note 32, at 187 (noting community's propensity to presuppose
"similarity on some level amongst those constituting the community").
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group. Through both these frames, privacy becomes the dominant
societal value. In other words, through both individuality and
community, we are promised a retreat from all those things that are not
like us. The individual is offered a retreat into his or her own space.
The community is offered a retreat into its own social space in
opposition to the rest of the world.
B. Individuals and Communities Are Connected with Each Other
Along with enshrining the value of privacy and its inherent
right of exclusion, the notions of communitarianism and individualism
can also blind us to the connections and relationships between, within,
and among persons and communities. 38 Furthermore, the promise to
retreat from those things not like us is really a promise available only
to the dominant group. This promise for the dominant class is
reflected and concretized in our society at a multitude of sites. For
example, one way retreat is available to the dominant group is in the
arrangement of political and geographical space in this nation.
39
I am now the Marvin J. Sonosky Chair of Law and Social
Policy at the University of Minnesota. Most of you have not heard of
Marvin Sonosky directly, but all of you have heard of him indirectly.
Sonosky is significant to this discussion because he represented Native
Americans in their legal action to reclaim the Black Hills from the
federal government.40 We have all heard of General Custer, and how
he was charged with protecting Native Americans on their lands in the
Black Hills. But when gold was found there, Custer and others
arranged to force the Native Americans off the sacred land so it could
be mined for gold. And of course, we have heard of Custer's last
38. Iris Young captures the exclusionary nature of community, writing that:
This ideal [of community] expresses a desire for the fusion of subjects
with one another which in practice operates to exclude those with whom
the group does not identify. The ideal of community denies and represses
social difference, the fact that the polity cannot be thought of as a unity in
which all participants share a common experience and common values.
YOUNG, supra note 1, at 227.
39. See john a. powell, Achieving Racial Justice: What's Sprawl Got to Do with It?,
POVERTY & RACE, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 2-5 [hereinafter Achieving Racial Justice].
40. Tracy N. Zlock, The Native American Tribe as a Client: An Ethical Analysis, 10
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 159, 163 (1996) (noting that Sonosky replaced another attorney, Ralph
Case, who mistakenly told the Sioux that if they signed a monetary settlement with the
government, they would lose the protections of other treaties they had signed with the
government and lose their ability to assert their right to title to the Black Hills).
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stand. Though in general education we are not told so, that stand was
really the result of Custer's greed and about his breaking the law. The
fight engaged in by the Native Americans to recover the Black Hills
continues to this day.4 1 Sonosky was the lawyer who eventually won a
settlement on behalf of the Native Americans, a judgment of
$105,000,000.42 Dennis Banks and others at Wounded Knee said, "no,
we don't want the money; we want the Black Hills.' 43 The struggle
was never about money." The struggle was about getting the land
back.45
I teach property law at the University of Minnesota. I always
begin the course with the Johnson v. M'Intosh. Johnson is a case that
deals with the taking of land from Native Americans in the early
1800S.46 A lot of my students, who are overwhelmingly white, sort of
muse: "why are we studying Native Americans?" "This is supposed to
be a property course," they complain. "What does property have to do
with Native American history?," they wonder. My response is always
this--"this is not only Native American history; this is your history."
Johnson v. M'Intosh does answer questions about how the
European settlers got this land from the Native Americans, but more
importantly it shows that there is a relationship between us and the
Native Americans. So when we talk about the appropriation of the
land we are talking about something that all of us in this country
engaged in, not something that Native Americans engaged in by
themselves. These connections extend to whites and blacks as well.
From time to time, I hear from other African Americans that
because of slavery and of being forced to work the land as farmers,
blacks do not like to get involved in land issues. However, as I argued
was the case with Native Americans, blacks' relationship to the land
did not occur in isolation of their relationship to whites. It was not the
land that enslaved black folks; it was white folks. So, if there is some
discomfort about African Americans' owning land, one might want to
41. Id. at 159-60, 163-66.
42. See id. at 159 (citing United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 423-24
(1980) (requiring the federal government to compensate the Sioux tribe for the taking of Black
Hills land).
43. See id. at 159, 165-66 (describing the refusal of the Sioux tribe to accept the
monetary settlement).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (refusing to uphold land titles held by
Native Americans and upholding titles to land acquired by conquest).
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look at what this means in terms of blacks' and whites' relationship
with each other, rather than looking only at blacks' relationship to the
land itself.
C. Race and Nation Are Also Intertwined
I take the position that one must look at the connections within
groups from the understanding that the ideology of individualism is,
and always has been, inextricably tied up with race. The bond between
race, racializing, racial construction, and individualism has critically'
influenced, and perhaps even pre-figured, the history of our nation.
In Making Race and Nation, Anthony Marx described the role of race
making, and showed how this role was critical to an understanding of
the development of our nation.48 Noted Marx:
Nationhood was institutionalized on the basis of race;
the political production of race and the political
production of nationhood were linked. Even changing
structures of the state, whether more or less centralized
or corporatist, were shaped by the deals elites made
about race in pursuit of nation-state consolidation.
49
Marx made clear that race was not an additive to the development of
this nation.50 In other words, racing was not an afterthought or by-
product. Its development occurred simultaneously with the making of
this nation. In this way, race and nation were inextricably linked.
Federalism is another example of the intertwining of race and
americanism. We have all heard of the great American experiment
with federalism. However, even given our years of education, most of
us do not realize that in many ways federalism was about the fight by
the southern states to remain relatively autonomous so that they could
continue to enslave blacks.51 So even the whole structure of this
nation-federalism-was a racialized process. This racialization
created such an imbalance, such a fragile and unstable nation-state,
47. See generally ANTHONY W. MARX, MAKING RACE AND NATION (1998).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 25.
50. Id. at 4-6, 10-15.
51. Id. at 13-14,60, 120.
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that in some ways the Civil War was necessary for us to become a
nation and not just a federation of states.52
D. Exclusion Is Also a Racialized Process
Notions of individuality and community and the idea of race
emerge repeatedly in this nation's history. In each episode of history,
autonomy-a seemingly neutral objective-has taken on life as an
exclusionary practice. Take the notion of who gets control over who
gets to vote. I argue that enfranchisement is the core characteristic and
right of an autonomous individual operating within a democratic
society. As a nation, other than membership in the ranks of those who
were systematically exploited and dominated, we initially expressly
excluded certain people from political membership.53  We defined
"autonomy" with all of its associated rights as maleness, whiteness,
and ownership in property. We defined lack of autonomy as "other"
with all of the associated lack of rights as femaleness, blackness, and
economic non-holding. Therefore, I argue that enfranchisement and
citizenship have been racialized and oppositional notions for decades.
As disenfranchised populations grew in political strength and
began to demand participation and voice, in order to reproduce
exclusion via autonomy, society subtly devised a reconfiguration of its
political and spatial boundaries.54 Under the law, cities were creatures
of the state, existing at the pleasure of the legislature. 55 The nature of
local governments began to change precisely at the time that blacks
and others started making demands for membership, demands for
political and jurisdictional space, such as homeownership and political
power within the metropolitan region.
56
52. Id. at 120-127.
53. See, e.g., id. at 218 (citing J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN
POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH 212
(1974) (noting that "[s]ubjected to poll taxes, property requirement for voting, and violence,
black voting declined precipitously [after reconstruction was abandoned], falling for instance
in Georgia's presidential election from 55 percent in 1876 to five percent in 1904").
54. See, e.g., Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations,
Racial Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L. J. 105, 155-56 (1992); see also
discussion infra note 57 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-179 (1907) (noting that
cities exist at the pleasure of the state government).
56. See Achieving Racial Justice, supra note 39, at 4-5 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717 (1974) (overturning the district court's order requiring interdistrict desegregation of
Detroit and 53 surrounding suburbs)).
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There was a southern response and a northern response to these
demands. In the South, as blacks moved into the central city and off
the farms, local governments responded by expanding the
jurisdictional boundaries so that blacks would never have political
control or an effective voice in terms of running their own lives or the
life of the city. 57  Consequently, county governments in the South
became increasingly important.5
The northern response was just the opposite. The northern
response to black and other minority group migration into the cities
was to abandon the city, and instead move to the suburbs. 59 In those
suburbs, whites were able to create their own homogeneous, separate,
autonomous communities, which were protected by the laws. And
although people at the time were more explicit in their expression of
racism than they are today, seldom did they say that homogeneity was
defined along the axis of whiteness.6 ' Suburbs were created out of the
idea of exclusion. Suburbs were created out of a desire to create
homogeneous communities, that is communities that excluded groups
defined as racial others.62 Thus, the process of exclusion and isolation
in metropolitan space was also a racialized process.
To make this happen though, local governments were able to
pull in the federal government to fund the building and maintenance of
57. See, e.g., Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations,
Racial Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L. J. 105, 132-33 (1992) (noting that in
an effort
[T]o negate black voting power, Richmond County [Georgia]'s legislative
delegation addressed the question of whether to eliminate the City of
Augusta [sic] by consolidating it with Richmond County, or instead to
enlarge the city by annexing adjoining suburbs .... This consolidation,
designed to avert black control of city government, would abolish the city
an independent legal entity and replace it with a new solidly white
political subdivision.).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., DENNIS R. JUDD, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN CITIES: PRIVATE POWER AND
PUBLIC POLICY 236, 240 (1979).
60. Id.
61. See Michael Schill & Susan Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and
Policy, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1310 (1995) (citing JUDD, supra note 59, at 281).
62. See The Multiple Self, supra note 8, at 1516 (citing Martha Mahoney, Segregation,
Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1659 (1995) (noting that
"[s]egregation is the product of notions of black inferiority and white superiority, manifested
geographically through the exclusion of blacks from more privileged white neighborhoods and
the concentration of blacks into subordinated neighborhoods stigmatized by both race and
poverty").
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the suburbs. 63  The federal government put language in its official
guidelines that made it clear that in order to participate in this process
you needed to be white.64  For example, the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) dictated that in order to get FHA funds you had
to do it in such a way that you were creating a racially homogeneous
community. 65 It was actually worse than that because the creation of
homogeneous communities would suggest that blacks too could
participate, as long as they created a virtually all-black community.
However, the manuals stated that:
The valuator should investigate areas surrounding the
location to determine whether or not incompatible
racial and social groups are present, to the end that an
intelligent prediction may be made regarding the
possibility or probability of the location being invaded
by such groups . . . . If a neighborhood is to retain
stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to
be occupied by the same social and racial classes.
66
I and others have argued that what the federal government really
meant was to create an all-white community, and so the federal purse
was opened to create these separate communities from which blacks
and other people of color were excluded.67
The timing and the scale of this process was and continues to
be highly significant. In 1950, about sixty percent of people living in
metropolitan areas were living in only about 190 jurisdictions across
68the country. By 1990, seventy percent of the population was living
63. See generally john a. powell, How Government Tax and Housing Policies Have
Racially Segregated America, in TAXING AMERICA 90-91 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise
Fellows, eds., 1996).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING
231 (1955) (quoting Federal Housing Administration Underwriting Manual §233 (1936), §937
(1938)).
67. See, e.g., Achieving Racial Justice, supra note 39, at 3; GERALD E. FRUG, CITY
MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 130-32 (1999) (citing DOUGLAS
S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF
THE UNDERCLASS 1-114 (1993)).
68. See DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING
URBAN AMERICA 66-67 (1999).
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in more than 9,000 separate jurisdictions. 69  The country had
fragmented, and this fragmentation along spatial lines was increasingly
fought over the battle of who was defined as the "community." The
line went, "we have a right to our own community, and 'those' people
do not fit in because they do not belong to our community."70 Thus,
the idea of sameness, which is individuality expressed at the
community level, was very much racialized, inscribed into law, and
remains a persistent problem today.
IV. How CAN WE TRANSFORM THE NATURE OF THIS RELATIONSHIP
AND THIS LANGUAGE?
A. Intersubjectivity and the Fragmented, Fluid Self
As we have seen in examining our nation's history, both the
idea of individuality and the idea of community are ones of
assimilation and sameness. However, I argue that the challenges for
liberals and progressives are to create a movement and a sense of
justice that does not simply adopt the dominant language of
individualism. But neither can they simply adopt the language of
community. The dominant ideology has to be adapted and
interrogated in such a way that promotes what we really are about. I
would like to make a few suggestions.
First, we are not simply individuals. We are not simply
separate from each other. In fact, the idea that we are not constituted
together through some process seems to me to be hopelessly flawed.
The term I like to use for the self is that it is intersubjective. That is,
we come into being in our relationships with one another. But we are
not just intersubjective. We also are intrasubjective, meaning that
even internally there are many different sites inside of us. We are not
unitary. We are fragmented inside. We are fluid inside, and what is
called to the front (made visible to others) depends oftentimes on
69. Id. at 67.
70. See generally GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS 4 (1999) (discussing community and exclusion and highlighting "the role
that the legal system has played in fostering the suburbanization of America" and other aspects
of urban life, like "unequal distribution of city services").
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circumstances, on institutions, on relationships, and on what remains
invisible.
7 1
I argue that because we never become completely transparent
to each other or even to ourselves, we do not become fused in the
communitarian sense. We never become the other, but neither are we
totally separated from the other. We are not infinitely strangers, nor
are we ever collapsed into one. Both of those dangers-of regarding
others as complete strangers, as in individualism, or as completely the
same as we are, as in the communitarian ideal-have to be challenged.
B. Autonomy: The Myth of the Free-Standing Individual
Where can these dangers be addressed? Iris Young has
suggested that "city space" is largely a space where we can come
together as strangers, in terms of constituting public life, in terms of
making justice, and in regard to politics. 72  In the city, meaning is
created among strangers that meet and intersect, at all levels.
However, at each level, politics also attach.
I have gone to a number of black and Latino communities
around the country where they have argued, first of all, that they are a
community. But probably more importantly, they argue that they want
to be a community, where autonomy and self-determination is their
right. It is clear that autonomy is the language of the private. 73 It is
also the language of sovereignty. In other words, autonomy suggests
that you can exclude all others. After having been excluded, it is not
surprising that African Americans and Latinos would think that the
way to control their community is also to exclude. But the goal should
71. See generally The Multiple Self supra note 8.
72. Young offers the alternative of what she terms "city life.-"a vision of social
relations affirming group difference" not limited to the city proper, but inclusive of the
metropolitan area. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 227. "City life" is, in her words:
[T]he being together of strangers. In the city, persons and groups interact
within spaces and institutions they all experience themselves as belonging
to, but without those interactions dissolving into unity or commonness.
City life is composed of clusters of people with affinities-families, social
group networks, voluntary associations, neighborhood networks, a vast
array of small "communities." Id. at 237.
73. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private
Autonomy: Lon Fuller's 'Consideration and Form', 100 COLUMB. L. REv. 94, 94, (2000)
(describing the notion of private autonomy and arguing that each one of the valid legal norms
(including private, public, and international law) are a product of what Kennedy calls the
"conflicting considerations" of formal, substantive, and institutional "policy questions").
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not be the right to exclude. Autonomy is a false goal. The idea of
self-determination is a false goal. And so in my opinion, autonomy,
which could be described as the myth of the free-standing individual,
is not desirable nor is it normatively appropriate.
Moreover, adopting these false goals and this inadequate
language cannot resolve our problems, and in fact, might actively
promote divisiveness. Consider again the relationship between the
public city and the private suburbs. What happens if each suburb is
allowed to be autonomous? The Court did this in the Milliken
decision.74 The Court basically said, "Detroit, you can try to solve
your problems of segregated schools, but you cannot do so by
interfering with the rights of these autonomous suburbs." Because
there was no way to try to resolve or adjust its segregation problems
(after all, the problem was the existence of those very same
autonomous suburbs) this statement by the Court is paradoxical. The
suburbs imposed segregation upon Detroit--economically, racially,
and fiscally.75 And in my opinion, without engaging the involvement
of the suburbs, Detroit cannot solve its own problems.
And yet, when community groups and people on the left get
involved in these issues, they oftentimes use the same language of
obtaining autonomy and sovereignty for their individual community.
76
Ironically, this could be the same autonomy and sovereignty that will
preclude solutions to their problems, because by conceptualizing
themselves as autonomous, they could exclude the group that may well
be the cause of and solution to their problems. Is there an alternative
language and an alternative voice? I argue that the language of
empowerment and intersubjectivity, not autonomy, is the appropriate
substitute.
74. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (overturning the district court's order
requiring interdistrict desegregation of Detroit and 53 surrounding suburbs).
75. PAUL DIMoND, BEYOND BUSING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN SEGREGATION
81-83 (1985) (describing how white flight created segregation in Detroit).
76. See FRUG, supra note 70, at 138-39 (describing an example of one way to push for
community in low-income African American neighborhoods by noting: "[a]s in the suburbs,
policing the boundaries of the black neighborhood-and of voluntary associations, and, in
some areas, of city blocks-helps residents reassure themselves that the people they encounter
will conform to the fictional unity often associated with the word 'community"').
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C. Empowerment vs. Distributive Justice
Empowerment is the right to participate with an effective voice
in decision-making and in rulemaking. Empowerment requires
calling institutions into being-not just for yourself, but for all
society. 8 This is because, in our political and public space, it is not
just about us, but about our relationship to the other.79 Empowerment
is about involving both those that we would call brothers and sisters
and about those that we would call strangers. And so, in a sense,
empowerment calls for an expanded view of relationships.
Empowerment says we ought to consider cultivating our relationships
with strangers. Empowerment calls for a community that is not
completely exclusive. Empowerment calls for a recognition that this
life process is not simply about getting goods, about getting another
seat in the law school, about getting a job, or about making money, but
this is also about constituting who we are as human beings.
The sole focus on fair distribution should be supplanted by a
transformation of who we are as humans. This transformation is an
element of empowerment. 80  This transformation is a constituted as
well as an instrumental process. It affects not only what we have, but
also who we are as a people. This is a vision that is very different than
the one that is the dominant vision in liberalism and the dominant
vision in society because it presupposes that our relationship with each
other is constituted and yet unclear. We never have full access to each
other, and yet we are not fully strangers. It suggests that the
institutional arrangements themselves are part of the discourse. It
suggests that the gatekeepers, whether they are the SATs or the bar
exam, are part of the public discourse that we as empowered citizens
can discuss and help decide.
CONCLUSION
I will close by writing briefly about what this discussion means
in terms of regionalism. 8 1 I have argued that, in some ways, the most
77. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 251.
78. See discussion supra pp. 6-7 and note 25.
79. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 237-38.
80. See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 248-56.
81. For a discussion of the metropolitan region as a potential site for redressing spatial
inequalities, See Sheryll Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored
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important frustration to the goals of the civil rights community since
1954 has been our geographical space.8 2  People ultimately end up
fighting over a narrow band of decisions when living in a georaphical
space that gets set up in relatively autonomous jurisdictions. In my
opinion, people living in autonomous jurisdictions do not get to decide
where capital is spent. They do not get to decide investment strategies.
They do not get to determine relationships with other countries.
However, what they do get to decide are the important local
issues involving education, housing, and law enforcement. But even
here, because they oftentimes are in competition with each other for
business relocations, they have to fight with the suburbs for
resources.84 "Do not move to the suburbs of Maryland. Move to
Baltimore, and we will give you more than they will give you." Yet,
neither the suburbanites nor the city dwellers claim to have control
over the capital needed to pay for those promises. And so, in that
fragmented context, I believe you cannot achieve the goals of civil
rights because those goals, as I understand them, are basically about
participation in the decision-making and structuring of society. But
society is not structured simply at the neighborhood level, and it is not
structured simply at the city level.
Instead, I would suggest that the regional level is a much more
appropriate level to talk about the control over resources like schools,
transportation, and allocation of tax dollars. This does not mean that
Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000) (arguing that
our nation's ideological commitment to decentralized local government has helped to create
the phenomenon of the favored quarter. "Favored quarters" are high-growth suburbs that
contain about one-quarter of the regional population, but capture a larger share of the region's
public infrastructure investment and job growth.); Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders:
A Partial Response to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1173 (1996) (arguing that local
governments are powerless, but that it may be impossible for them to achieve autonomy from
larger polities); and Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in
Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN L. REv. 1115 (1996) (acknowledging that hands-on political
participation is more likely to occur in smaller polities, than in large ones, but concluding that
regional governance offers a more promising way to achieve fairness).
82. See generally Achieving Racial Justice, supra note 39, at 2-5 (arguing that "spatial
arrangement has been the single most effective tool for maintaining black subordination since
the repeal of Jim Crow laws").
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Greg Leroy & Tyson Slocum, Another Way Sprawl Happens: Economic
Development Subsidies in a Twin Cities Suburb (January, 2000) (report written under the
auspices of Good Job First, which is a project of the Institute of Taxation and Economic
Policy) (on file with the author, john a. powell) (describing the use of municipal subsidies to
trigger the relocation of businesses within metropolitan regions).
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every decision should be made by a whole region, and it certainly does
not mean that I am advocating the southern model of having larger and
larger jurisdictional bodies so that blacks', Latinos', and others' voices
and power are constantly diluted.8 5  What this kind of regionalism
means is finding an appropriate balance between. accessing regional
resources and empowering local voices. What it means is recognizing
that localities, whether neighborhoods or cities, exist in relationship to
the wider community. What it means is thinking of the suburbs not as
exclusive enclaves where the residents and officials try to capture all
the high-income housing, try to absorb all the high-income jobs, and
try to exclude all people with need. 86 What it means is reclaiming
public space for all.
I will close with a quotation from James Baldwin: "we are all
androgynous, not only because we are all born of a woman
impregnated by the seed of a man but because each of us, helplessly
and forever, contains the other-male in female, female in male, white
in black, and black in white .... [M]any of my countrymen appear to
find this fact exceedingly inconvenient and even unfair, and so, very
often, do I. But none of us can do anything about it."87
85. See john a. powell, Addressing Regional Dilemmas for Minority Communities, in
REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM 230-32 (Bruce Katz, ed., 2000) (discussing the concern over
political power dilution).
86. See generally Sheryll Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the
Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L. J. 1985 (2000).
87. See BALDWIN, supra note 29, at 690.
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